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RULE 10b-5 OMISSIONS CASES AND THE
INVESTMENT DECISION
MARK A. HELMAN*
INTRODUCTION
T he judicially created private right of action' under Rule 10b-5
(Rule)2 permits a defrauded security purchaser or seller to recover
damages from the perpetrator of the fraud. Because the private action
is not an action for enforcement, 3 the plaintiff must show that his
injury was caused by the defendant. 4 Drawing from the common-law
action for fraud,5 courts prior to 1972 required the plaintiff, in an
*Secretary of Burgess & Leith Incorporated, a member firm of the New York Stock
Exchange. B.A. 1972, M.A. 1974, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1978, Boston
College.
1. Rule 10b-5 was not originally drafted to create a private right of action.
Note, SEC Rule lOb-5: A Recent Profile, 13 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 860, 865-66 &
n.27 (1972). Moreover, the legislative history of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 indicates that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action for
securities fraud. Bromberg, Are There Limits to Rule lOb-5?, 29 Bus. Law. 167, 167
(1974) (Special Issue); see Note, Reliance Under Rule lOb-5: Is the "Reasonable
Investor" Reasonable?, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 562, 563-65 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Reasonable Investor]. The first case to imply a private right of action under the Rule
was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802-03 (E.D. Pa.), modified
on other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947). The Supreme Court first
recognized that a federal securities statute implied a private right of action in J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964), and acknowledged a private right of
action under the Rule in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
6, 13 n.9 (1971).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982) (promulgated under the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(b) (1976)). The Rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
3. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1016 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977).
4. See 2 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, Securities Fraud & Commodities Fraud
§ 4.7(550-551) (1981); 3 id. § 8.7(1); 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1430-44 (2d ed.
1961).
5. Because the Rule was designed to protect investors from deceptive practices
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, Crane, An Analysis of Causation
Under Rule lOb-5, 9 Sec. Reg. L.J. 99, 116 (1981), the common-law tort of fraud has
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action under the Rule, to establish inter alia that the defendant mis-
represented or omitted a material fact 6 and that the plaintiff relied on
the misrepresentation or omission in making his investment decision.
7
In cases of misrepresentation, proof of reliance does not pose special
difficulties. But in cases in which the defendant omits material facts,
the plaintiff's task is far more difficult." Recognizing the practical
difficulty of proving whether an omission was relied upon,9 the Su-
preme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States10 came to the
aid of plaintiffs. The Court held that proof of reliance in cases involv-
ing primarily a failure to disclose was not a prerequisite to recovery;
rather, all that was required was a showing that the defendant had an
provided the foundation for developing the compensatory elements of the private
right of action under the Rule. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 4, at 1430-44; Note, The
Nature and Scope of the Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule
10b-5, 24 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 363, 366-69 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Private
Actions]. Although the private action under the Rule is based on the common law,
courts have gone beyond the common law in defining its nature and scope. Whalen,
Causation and Reliance in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 13 Pac. L.J. 1003,
1015 (1982); Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule
1Ob-5, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 584, 585 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Reliance Requirement].
6. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965).
7. List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965), is the case cited most often for the
proposition that reliance is a necessary element of a 10b-5 private action. See, e.g.,
Stoll, Reliance as an Element in 10b-5 Actions, 53 Or. L. Rev. 169, 173 (1974);
Private Actions, supra note 5, at 368. One commentator contends, however, that the
List test is not one of reliance but is rather a "but for" test indicating causation in
fact. Whalen, supra note 5. at 1021.
8. It may be impossible for a plaintiff to prove with any certainty that he relied
upon the converse of an omitted fact in deciding to engage in a securities transaction.
See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text. In the context of omissions, the distinc-
tion between materiality and reliance has been blurred. 3 A. Bromberg & L. Lowen-
fels, supra note 4,. § 8.6(1) ("[Reliance, causation and materiality] have become
partially interchangeable and various combinations [may] suffice in different situa-
tions."); see Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 92 n.6 (2d
Cir. 1981) ("The concepts of reliance and causation have often been used inter-
changeably in the context of rule 10b-5 cases."). One court has noted:
[W]e prefer to recognize that materiality directly establishes causation more
likely than not, and that reliance as a separate requirement is simply a
milepost on the road to causation. The net result is in either view the same;
the validity of either view turns on the assumption that the particular
investor is more likely to act like the reasonable investor than not.
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 n.22 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
816 (1976). But see Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 548-49 (5th
Cir. 1981) (subjective reliance standard, "tempered by the requirement of due dili-
gence on the part of the plaintiff," contrasted with materiality and causation), cert.
granted, 102 S. Ct. 1766 (1982).
9. See Whalen, supra note 5, at 1050.
10. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
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obligation to disclose the omitted fact to the plaintiff" and that the
omission was objectively material. 1 2
It was initially thought that this holding, characterized in subse-
quent cases as the "Ute presumption" of reliance,' 3 provided the
standard of proof of reliance for every action under the Rule. Deci-
sions since 1972, however, have varied in their treatment of Affiliated
Ute. 14 Most courts, not eager to abandon the linkage of the Rule lOb-5
private remedy to the individual circumstances and injury of the
plaintiff, have found the Ute presumption to be rebuttable' 5 and/or
have imposed a requirement of due diligence on the plaintiff.1 6 De-
spite these efforts to circumvent Affiliated Ute, defendants still have a
difficult burden defending against 10b-5 omissions cases.
17
11. In cases of total nondisclosure, the plaintiff must show before reaching the
causation issue that the defendant had a duty to disclose the omitted fact. See, e.g.,
id. at 153; Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 235-38
(2d Cir. 1974). In Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Supreme
Court held that the duty to disclose arises "when one party has information 'that the
other . . . is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust
and confidence between them,' "id. at 228 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §
551(2)(a) (1976)), and the Court limited the applicability of Affiliated Ute to such
circumstances. See id. at 229-30. Whether a duty to disclose material information
exists is beyond the scope of this Article; for purposes of this Article such a disclosure
duty will be assumed. For a general discussion of the duty to disclose, see Brudney,
Insiders, Outsiders and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322 (1979).
12. 406 U.S. at 153-54.
13. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 468 (5th Cir. 1981); see Holdsworth v. Strong,
545 F.2d 687, 695 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); Simon v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880, 884 (5th Cir. 1973).
14. See infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text. See generally Crane, supra
note 5, at 102-03 (discussion of treatment of Affiliated Ute by lower federal courts);
Whalen, supra note 5, at 1040-55 (same).
15. See, e.g., Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266, 1271-72 (6th Cir.
1975); Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1975); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades,
491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976). For arguments
in support of the rebuttability of the Ute presumption, see Whalen, supra note 5, at
1050; Reliance Requirement, supra note 5, at 597-600.
16. See, e.g., Bird v. Ferry, 497 F.2d 112, 114 (5th Cir. 1974); Rochez Bros. v.
Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 409 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976);
Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 521 (10th
Cir) (per curiam), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973). Articles that have focused upon
the plaintiff's "due diligence" requirement include Wheeler, Plaintiff's Duty of Due
Care Under Rule 10b-5: An Implied Defense to an Implied Remedy, 70 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 561 (1976); Note, The Due Diligence Requirement for Plaintiffs Under Rule
10b-5, 1975 Duke L.J. 753 [hereinafter cited as Due Diligence Requirement]; Note,
A Reevaluation of the Due Diligence Requirement for Plaintiffs in Private Actions
Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 904 [hereinafter cited as Due Diligence
Reevaluation].
17. For the same reasons that plaintiffs had difficulty proving reliance in cases of
nondisclosure prior to Affiliated Ute, see infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text,
defendants now have great difficulty rebutting the presumption by introducing
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This Article contends that the defendant's burden is more easily met
by the use of a careful analysis of the plaintiff's investment decision,
which may then be applied to the elements of causation under the
Rule. Part I of this Article sets forth the elements necessary to show
causation and summarizes the various, often conflicting, positions
that courts have taken with respect to each. Part II examines the ways
in which evidence concerning the plaintiff's investment decision in a
face-to-face transaction has been analyzed and used to show a lack of
causation under the Rule. Finally, Part III shows how such evidence
has been analyzed and used even more broadly in open market trans-
actions.
I. ELEMENTS OF TRANSACTION CAUSATION
Causation under Rule 10b-5 takes two forms. The first is the re-
quirement "that the defendant's fraud must precipitate the [plain-
tiff's] investment decision.11 8 The second refers to "a direct causal link
between the misstatement [or omission] and the claimant's economic
loss."'1 These two forms have been referred to, respectively, as trans-
action causation and loss causation. 20 This Article primarily examines
the ways in which the investment decision can be analyzed to show a
lack of transaction causation. Before examining the defenses to evi-
dence of this form of causation, however, it is first necessary to discuss
the three elements courts have required to prove transaction causa-
tion-materiality, reliance and due diligence.
evidence of nonreliance. See Reliance Requirement, supra note 5, at 590 n.33, 598.
Moreover, some courts have relaxed the duty of care imposed upon plaintiffs in
response to the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185 (1976), which was that the Rule requires scienter. E.g., Mallis v. Bankers Trust
Co., 615 F.2d 68, 77-79 (2d Cir. 1980) (recklessness standard), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1123 (1981); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1020 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
911 (1977) (same). In addition, several courts have shifted to the defendant the
burden of proving plaintiff's lack of due care. E.g., Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615
F.2d 68, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981); Straub v. Vaisman
& Co., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 1976).
18. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 n.24 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1766 (1982).
19. Id.
20. This terminology was first suggested in an article analyzing Rule 14a-9. Note,
Causation and Liability in Private Actions for Proxy Violations, 80 Yale L.J. 107,
123-25 (1970). Although some courts have adopted this terminology in analyzing
Rule lOb-5, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 816 (1976); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-82 (2d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975), it is not generally used by courts.
Crane, supra note 5, at 100; Whalen, supra note 5, at 1016 n.95. Nevertheless,
commentators have found this distinction useful for purposes of analysis. Crane,
supra note 5, at 100; Whalen, supra note 5, at 1016 n.95.
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A. Materiality
The requirement in a common-law action for fraud that a misrep-
resentation or omission be objectively significant, or "material, 21
protects the defendant from a plaintiffs use of any misrepresented or
omitted fact, no matter how trivial, "as a pretext for escaping a
bargain that he is dissatisfied with on other grounds. '22 The conven-
tional test for materiality at common law is whether a reasonable man
would attach importance to the misrepresentation or omission in de-
termining his choice of action.2 3 Federal courts have drawn upon the
common-law tort of deceit to establish a requirement of materiality
under the Rule. 24 In TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc.,25 a Rule 14(a)-
9 case, 26 the Supreme Court set forth a test of materiality:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that
... the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the
deliberations of the reasonable shareholder .... [T]here must be a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the "total mix" of information made available.
27
Courts have held this to be the controlling test in Rule 10b-5 actions.28
B. Reliance
At common law, proof of the causal connection between the de-
fendant's fraudulent conduct and the resulting injury to the plaintiff
requires a showing that the plaintiff relied to his detriment upon the
misrepresentation. 29 Initially, federal courts had imposed a similar
21. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Restate-
ment]; W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 108 (4th ed. 1971).
22. W. Prosser, supra note 21, at 719 (quoting Keeton, Actionable Misrepresen-
tation: Legal Fault as a Requirement I. Rescission, 2 Okla. L. Rev. 56, 59 (1949)).
23. Restatement, supra note 21, § 538(2)(a), at 80; W. Prosser, supra note 21, at
719.
24. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
25. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(a)-9(a) (1982), governs, in language similar to that of the
Rule, the solicitation of shareholder proxies.
27. 426 U.S. at 449 (footnote omitted).
28. E.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 49 (1977) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); S.D. Cohn & Co. v. Woolf, 426 U.S. 944 (1976) (remanding 10b-5 case
for reconsideration in light of Northway); Kramas v. Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 672
F.2d 766, 769 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1982); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553
F.2d 1033, 1040 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Berman v. Gerber
Prods. Co., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,506, at 93,956
(W.D. Mich. 1978).
29. W. Prosser, supra note 21, § 105, at 686; id. § 108, at 714-20.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
requirement in 10b-5 actions. 30 But in its 1972 decision of Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States,3' the Supreme Court departed from the
common-law requirement and altered the reliance requirement under
the Rule by raising a presumption of reliance in certain circumstances.
Affiliated Ute involved a scheme to sell stock in an association that
was formed to manage claims of the Ute Indian tribe concerning oil,
gas and mineral rights. The individual defendants, employees of the
transfer agent, had been acting as market makers in the securities
without disclosing that fact, effecting sales to nonmembers of the tribe
at substantial mark-ups over the price at which they bought the
shares. 32 The Tenth Circuit held that the misstatement of price was a
basis of Rule lOb-5 liability, 33 but was unwilling to permit recovery
because the record disclosed no evidence of reliance on the misrepre-
sentations. 34 On review, the Supreme Court re-characterized the
fraud as primarily an omission-the omission to state facts concerning
the defendants' function as market makers. The Court went on to hold
that in these circumstances reliance could be presumed from the
materiality of the omission:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure
to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recov-
ery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in
the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them
important in the making of this decision .... This obligation to
disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish the requi-
site element of causation in fact.35
This holding has become known as the "Ute presumption" of reli-
ance. 
36
30. E.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965).
31. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). In the early 1970's, the use of Rule 10b-5 was greatly
expanded as a private remedy for a defrauded investor. Herpich v. Wallace, 430
F.2d 792, 804 (5th Cir. 1970). Among the aspects of the Rule that were affected were
the "abolition or relaxation of the purchaser-seller standing rule, erosion of the
scienter standard, and elimination of the privity requirement." Due Diligence Re-
quirement, supra note 16, at 753 (footnotes omitted). See generally Bromberg, supra
note 1.
32. 406 U.S. at 145-51.
33. Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom.
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
34. Id. at 1348.
35. 406 U.S. at 153-54.
36. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Since Affiliated Ute, defendants
have attempted to circumvent this presumption. Some of the grounds upon which
defendants have sought to distinguish Affiliated Ute are:
It is not certain whether, by [its holding in Affliated Ute], the Supreme
Court meant to eliminate reliance as an issue altogether. It may be that
"'under these circumstances" means nondisclosure, or face-to-face transac-
tions, or transactions between the sophisticated and the unsophisticated, or
any combination of the foregoing.
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Subsequent decisions of lower federal courts have disagreed
whether reliance is still required. Several early cases held that proof of
reliance is not necessary for 10b-5 recovery. 37 Most courts, however,
distinguish between misrepresentations and omissions, requiring proof
of reliance with regard to the former and imposing the Ute presump-
tion on the latter .3 Some have simply applied the Ute presumption to
omissions cases without analysis, 39 although others have found that
difficulties of proof support the distinction. Because no special diffi-
culty exists in demonstrating reliance in cases of misrepresentation, 40
requiring a showing of reliance furthers the compensatory purpose of
private actions without imposing an undue burden on plaintiffs. 41 In
contrast, proof of reliance " 'has little rational role' in cases of nondis-
closure, largely because of the difficulty of proving reliance on the
negative. '42 Raising a presumption of reliance upon a showing of
materiality alleviates this difficult burden, 43 and several courts have
used the difficulty of proof of reliance to support application of the
Ute presumption in omissions cases. 44 However, because the Rule is
Wheeler, supra note 16, at 594 n.105; see, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974) (defendant argued that Affiliated
Ute should be applicable only to face-to-face transactions); Simon v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1973) (defendant successfully
argued that Affiliated Ute should be applicable to nondisclosure only when there was
general reliance on defendant's representations).
37. Swanson v. American Consumer's Indus., 475 F.2d 516, 520-21 (7th Cir.
1973); Davis v. Avco Corp., 371 F. Supp. 782, 792 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Allen Organ
Co. v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1117, 1127 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
38. Crane, supra note 5, at 103; see, e.g., Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem.
Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Forrestal Village,
Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d 411, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen,
513 F.2d 234, 238-39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975). One commentator
has criticized the omission/misrepresentation distinction, noting that most misrepre-
sentations can be phrased in terms of omissions. Crane, supra note 5, at 103. One
court has extended the Ute presumption to misrepresentations. Carras v. Burns, 516
F.2d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1975).
39. E.g., Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 558 (1st Cir. 1978); Rochez Bros. v.
Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976).
40. Whalen, supra note 5, at 1047-48; Reliance Requirement, supra note 5, at
589. Reliance, by definition, requires a belief in the truth of the misrepresentation
and action based on that belief. W. Prosser, supra note 21, § 108, at 714-15.
41. Reliance Requirement, supra note 5, at 589-90. But as one commentator
noted, the Ute presumption "is not wholly consistent with the compensatory function
of the private action .... [S]ome plaintiffs who did not in fact rely upon a material
nondisclosure might recover if a presumption were adopted." Id. at 590.
42. Reliance Requirement, supra note 5, at 590 (quoting 3 A. Bromberg &
L. Lowenfels, supra note 4, § 8.6(1) at 209); accord Whalen, supra note 5, at 1039,
1050.
43. Whalen, supra note 5, at 1050; Reliance Requirement, supra note 5, at 590.
44. E.g., Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 695 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied
430 U.S. 955 (1977); Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266, 1271 (6th Cir.
1975); Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 840 (1975).
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not a policy of "investors' insurance,"'45 some of the courts adhering to
the misrepresentation/omission distinction have made the presump-
tion of reliance in omissions cases rebuttable. 46
C. Due Diligence
The common-law action for fraud requires that reliance be justifi-
able,47 as courts have reasoned that a plaintiff who relies on "prepos-
terous" representations or who closes his eyes to the "patently and
obviously false" should be responsible'for his own loss. 48 From this
concept courts developed the broader requirement under the Rule of
due diligence, which requires the investor as a prerequisite to recovery
to take reasonable steps to protect his interests. 49 Particularly follow-
ing Affiliated Ute, and perhaps to circumvent its presumption of
reliance, 50 the requirement of due diligence has been generally treated
as a separate element of a lOb-5 claim, distinct from the reliance
issue.,5
Prior to 1976, many courts permitted recovery under the Rule even
though the defendant's conduct was merely negligent, 52 provided that
plaintiff could show his own due diligence. These courts analogized
the requirement of due diligence to the defense of contributory negli-
45. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 811 (1965).
46. Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 262-63 (5th Cir. 1978); St. Louis Union Trust
Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d 1040, 1049 (8th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.,
553 F.2d 1033, 1048 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Chelsea Assocs. v.
Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266, 1271-72 (6th Cir. 1975); Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 257
(4th Cir. 1975); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976).
47. Restatement, supra note 21, § 537; W. Prosser, supra note 21, § 108, at 715-
18.
48. W. Prosser, supra note 21, § 108, at 716.
49. E.g., Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 103-04 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d
221, 230-31 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970). One commentator has
recently pointed out that requiring some form of due care on the part of the plaintiff
furthers the underlying policies of the Securities Acts-to provide access to relevant
information and to ensure market stability: "Market stability may be threatened as
much by investor carelessness as it is by manipulations and full access to information
is useless if investors are not encouraged to take advantage of that access. Both these
policies are promoted by requiring some form of investor caution." Crane, supra note
5, at 116.
50. See Crane, supra note 5, at 112.
51. E.g., Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 409 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976); Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100,
103-04 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); Crane, supra note 5, at
112; Due Diligence Requirement, supra note 16, at 760-61.
52. E.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963).
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gence. 53 In 1976, when the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hoch-
felder5 4 required proof of scienter under the Rule, it prompted lower
courts to decide whether due diligence was still a necessary showing
when the defendant's actions were intentional.
Several circuits have rejected the due diligence requirement as a
distinct element of transaction causation. 55 For example, in
Holdsworth v. Strong,56 the Tenth Circuit noted that Ernst & Ernst
brought "the standards for 10b-5 liability closer to the analogous tort
of deceit or intentional misrepresentation." 57 The court reasoned that,
"[j]ust as contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort
case of fraud, similarly due diligence is totally inapposite in the con-
text of intentional conduct required to be proved under Rule 10b-5. 58
After holding the due diligence requirement inapplicable, the court
stated that the plaintiff must still show that his reliance was justifi-
able, and that he would not be justified in relying "on a misrepresen-
tation where its falsity is palpable."59 In effect, by substituting justifi-
able reliance for due diligence, the court "subsumed the idea of some
standard of care into the element of reliance. '60
Other circuits have retained the due diligence requirement as an
independent element of a lOb-5 action but have relaxed the standard
of care imposed on plaintiffs from reasonableness to lack of reckless-
ness."' In Dupuy v. Dupuy,6 2 the court stated that since reliance may
never become an issue in omissions cases after Affiliated Ute, a justifi-
able reliance analysis as in Holdsworth would "remove from plaintiffs
the responsibility of exercising due care to protect their interests in
omission cases."'6 3 Because the court recognized "the need for a causal
link between the ... omission and the injury suffered by the private
plaintiff,"61 4 it retained the due diligence requirement as a means of
53. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1018-19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 911 (1977).
54. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
55. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1040 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 692 (10th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
56. 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
57. Id. at 693.
58. Id. at 694.
59. Id.
60. Due Diligence Reevaluation, supra note 16, at 914.
61. Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1123 (1981); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1020 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 911 (1977). Prior to its decision in Mallis, the Second Circuit had initially
reaffirmed the reasonableness standard. Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo See.
Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 485-86 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045
(1980); Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 762-63 (2d Cir. 1977).
62. 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977).
63. Id. at 1015-16.
64. Id. at 1016.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
preserving causation under the Rule. The court found it necessary,
however, to relax the standard of care, in light of Ernst & Ernst, from
a reasonableness standard to one of recklessness-whether the plain-
tiff "intentionally refused to investigate" in disregard of a known or
obvious risk.65
The Third Circuit has similarly retained the due diligence require-
ment but has refused to relax the standard of plaintiff's care. In Straub
v. Vaisman & Co.,66 the court stated that tort concepts were "not
determinative" and must be "balanced against the policies underlying
the federal securities laws."'67 The need to deter investor carelessness,
the court reasoned, justified retaining a standard of reasonable care,
despite its inapplicability to common-law fraud. The court treated the
failure to meet the standard of due diligence as an affirmative defense,
the burden of proof resting upon the defendant. 8
Despite these apparent differences in the treatment of the duty of
due care under the Rule, the cases in fact share important elements.
They all impose some standard of care on the investor-reasonable-
ness or lack of recklessness-either as an element of reliance, as a
separate element of plaintiff's 10b-5 action or as an affirmative de-
fense with the burden of proof on the defendant. Moreover, courts
generally agree that the duty is subjective and flexible, and depends
on the training, experience and knowledge of the particular investor.
II. THE INVESTMENT DECISION AND CAUSATION
IN FACE-TO-FACE TRANSACTIONS
A. Superior Disclosure
The problem of incomplete disclosure lies at the root of the Rule,
which clearly would not be necessary if unlimited information were
always provided to and analyzed by investors. Given that unlimited
disclosure is impossible, an omission must be analyzed in light of the
information which has in fact been disclosed to the investor. In deter-
mining causation under the Rule, courts analyze the investor's ability
to reason, given his sophistication 6  and knowledge, from the fur-
65. Id. at 1020.
66. 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976).
67. Id. at 597.
68. Id. at 598.
69. The investor's investment training and experience is generally referred to in
the literature as "sophistication." E.g., Due Diligence Requirement, supra note 16,
at 768; Reliance Requirement, supra note 5, at 602. One commentator has listed five
factors which may indicate that an investor has a greater duty to investigate: 1)
general business experience and expertise; 2) acquaintance with affairs of the corpo-
ration; 3) access to information misrepresented; 4) existence of a fiduciary relation-
ship with the defendant; and 5) whether the investor initiated the transaction.
Reasonable Investor, supra note 1, at 567-75. Some of these factors bear upon
sophistication, although others bear upon access to information, and the last clearly
relates to investment motivations.
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nished information to the alleged omission. If disclosures were suffi-
cient to lead the investor, in view of his level of sophistication, to infer
the omitted fact or to make further inquiries, a court may deny
plaintiff's recovery on grounds that he did not justifiably rely on the
omission (thereby rebutting the Ute presumption) or that he failed to
live up to his duty of care. Alternatively, the court may characterize
the omitted fact as immaterial; that is, given that he would be able to
discern the omitted fact from the disclosure a reasonable investor
would not have considered the omission important in his investment
decision. The disclosure from which this inference or notice is drawn
is referred to in this Article as "superior disclosure." As illustrated
below, superior disclosure has arisen in the context of three general
categories: financial statements, loss of key contracts and mergers and
sales of control.
1. Financial Statements
Defendants have successfully used financial statements as superior
disclosures to defend against allegations of non-disclosure because of
the detail in which such statements are presented. Hirsch v. du Pont,70
which arose against a backdrop of extensive financial reporting,7' was
well suited to such a defense. The plaintiffs, who had sold a small
brokerage firm to the defendants in exchange for limited partnership
interests, sued for rescission under the Rule. The defendant's annual
"surprise audit" report filed with the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) revealed a net capital deficiency of $6.8 million, 72 with approx-
imately $37 million in security count differences.7 3 Moreover, the New
York Stock Exchange was dissatisfied with the defendant's treatment
of dividend differences, and therefore charged the defendant's net
capital with an additional $10.5 million. The "nub" of the plaintiffs'
complaint was the non-disclosure of this additional charge to net
capital.7 4
The defendant convinced the court that enough information had
been disclosed so that the plaintiffs, "wise in the ways of Wall Street
as a result of long and prosperous experience, '7 5 could have inferred
the information that was allegedly omitted. The controller of the
plaintiffs' brokerage firm had received a completed data questionnaire
70. 553 F.2d 750 (2d. Cir. 1977).
71. In addition to a "surprise audit" report certified by the accounting firm of
Haskins and Sells, id. at 754, the defendant was required by Rule 416 of the New
York Stock Exchange to prepare monthly reports concerning its financial condition.
The reports include income and balance sheet information regarding a brokerage
firm, and its computation of net capital reserves. See New York Stock Exchange Rule
416, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2416, at 3721.
72. 553 F.2d at 754.
73. Id. "Securities count differences exist when physical inventory of securities on
hand fail to tally with a broker's records." Id. at 754 n.5.
74. Id. at 755.
75. Id. at 753.
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which formed the basis of both the defendant's and the Stock Ex-
change's net capital computations; had he desired, he could have
made his own computations from the accurate information it con-
tained. 76 Moreover, the disclosure of a massive capital shortage, what-
ever the extent, was a superior disclosure which should have put the
plaintiffs on notice to make further inquiries. 77 Thus, the additional
capital deficiency due to the Exchange's treatment of dividend differ-
ences "was not a 'new fact' in the ordinary sense"; it merely repre-
sented an exercise of judgment by the Exchange concerning disclosed
facts after the audit had been completed s.7 As a result of these superior
disclosures, the court found either that the omission was not material
or that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their duty of care.79
The distinction between an omission and an investor's mistaken
judgment from existing disclosures is further highlighted in a more
recent case, Rice v. Baron.80 The case involved a transfer of control to
the plaintiff, who had been groomed to succeed the defendant in
management and ownership of a closely held corporation.8' Two
years before the plaintiffs purchase a fire had damaged property
managed by the company. The company maintained no liability cov-
erage although it had received an opinion of counsel that any exposure
was covered by the insurance of the property owner.8 2 As the claims
proliferated, counsel indicated that the exposure exceeded the insur-
ance coverage, but opined that the eventual liability at trial or settle-
ment would in all likelihood be within the coverage. 83 Both opinions
had been referenced in footnotes to annual reports-the first in the
annual report immediately preceding the sale, and the second, modi-
fied opinion, in the next annual report, completed before the first
payment was due.8 4 The claims liability ultimately exceeded the insur-
ance coverage. 5
Assuming arguendo that the plaintiff had no access to the corporate
records concerning the fire litigation, 86 the court treated these foot-
76. Id. at 761.
77. Id. at 762-63.
78. Id. at 761.
79. Id. at 762-63. The standard of care imposed on plaintiffs was subsequently
lowered in the Second Circuit in Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981), which required plaintiffs to merely negate
recklessness. Id. at 77-79.
80. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,200, at 96,579
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1979).
81. Id. at 96,582.
82. Id. at 96,581.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 96,581-82.
85. Id. at 96,581.
86. The court found that the plaintiff, who had recently replaced the defendant
as chief executive officer, had had access to the corporate files regarding the fire for
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notes as superior disclosures. The footnote reference in the annual
report, while optimistic as to the eventual liability, did indicate that
the damage claims exceeded the insurance coverage. s7 Moreover, the
statement itself had been qualified as to the extent of liability. 88 These
disclosures had put the plaintiff "on notice to exercise due diligence to
inform himself."8' 9 His failure to exercise this duty prevented him from
succeeding on his claim.90
The impact that a plaintiff's sophistication may have upon the
adequacy of financial statements as superior disclosures is highlighted
in Holmes v. Bateson,91 a case involving a widow. The plaintiffs
decedent had originally been a partner in a contracting business, and
later became a shareholder after the business was incorporated. The
decedent died soon after incorporation, when the business had begun
to convert its books from cash to accrual accounting.92 The buy-out of
the estate by the defendants, until a different valuation was arrived
at, was to be related to the book value of the combined operations of
the corporation and the partnership. 93 Although the estate had been
provided with cash basis statements as of the time of death and as of
the closing nine months later, 94 it had not been furnished with accrual
basis statements. 95
two years prior to the stock purchase, during which time he was "situated to learn
whatever he wanted to know about the fire action cases and what action [the
company] had taken in regard thereto." Id. at 96,583. Although the primary respon-
sibility for the cases lay with another principal in the firm, the plaintiff "must have
known or should have known what was in those files before he ... consummated the
... agreement." Id.
87. Id.
88. The first page of the financial statements received by the plaintiff prior to his
first payment carried the accountants' disclosure that "because of the possible mate-
rial effect of the lawsuit (note g), we are precluded from expressing an opinion on the
accompanying financial statements." Id. at 96,582 (emphasis omitted).
89. Id. at 96,583.
90. See id. at 96,584.
91. 583 F.2d 542 (1st Cir. 1978).
92. Id. at 547-48. After the incorporation, the accounts receivable for works in
progress were to remain in the partnership, id., while the corporation, its sharehold-
ers having elected Subchapter S treatment, showed substantial losses. See id. In
addition to her difficulties with the cash basis statements, the plaintiff alleged that
these losses misrepresented the financial condition of the corporation. See id. at 553.
93. The court noted that "deceased partner's share consisted of his capital ac-
count, his share of partnership receivables, and his share of work in progress," id. at
549 n.7, although the buy-out agreement also provided that the remaining partners
could enter into "any other mutually satisfactory arrangement or agreement with the
estate of the deceased." Id. at 547 n.4.
94. Id. at 550.
95. See id. at 552-53. The accrual basis statements had been alluded to, however,
in a copy of a letter given to counsel for the plaintiff, who also represented the
business on matters not concerning the estate. Id. at 554. The court diminished the
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The defendants argued that the cash basis statements were a supe-
rior disclosure from which the relevant accrual items could be deter-
mined.96 The court rejected this argument, however, noting that the
accrual figures could be determined only "[i]f one possesse[d] a high
[degree] of accounting skill and [was] thoroughly familiar with the
structure of the partnership and the corporation. '97 It did not agree
"that the statements display the accrual profit of the corporation in
any readily understandable fashion."9'
Much as in Dupont and Rice, the result in Holmes depended upon
the skill of the plaintiff to reason from the information available to
her. While a more sophisticated plaintiff may have taken a different
view of the $1.3 million cash loss that was available to the parties for
tax purposes, the plaintiff convinced the court that she believed this
boded ill for the future of the corporation, even when coupled with
the substantial partnership income. 99 Moreover, a more sophisticated
plaintiff would likely have requested accrual figures, particularly af-
ter the recent conversion of the business to accrual accounting. In
contrast to the Rice court, which found that more detail should have
been requested by the plaintiff, and the Dupont court, which found
that the plaintiff was capable of making the necessary calculations
from the data furnished, the Holmes court expected the financial facts
to be spelled out for the unsophisticated plaintiff.
These cases highlight the difference between an omission and a
mistaken judgment from existing disclosures. The defendant need not
disclose "mountain[s] of information"1 0 to the plaintiff, but is entitled
to a reasonable belief that the plaintiff will be able to make inferences
from existing disclosures in view of the plaintiff's sophistication. If a
court finds that a plaintiff merely made a mistake in judgment or
significance of the plaintiff's representation by counsel, hinting that counsel's joint
representation of the plaintiff and the business posed a conflict of interest problem,
which may have led to a less than vigilant attitude toward the honesty of the
corporate principals. Id. Thus the copy of the letter referring to the existence of
accrual basis statements was not deemed adequate disclosure to the plaintiff. Id.
96. The defendants alleged "that their reading and interpretation of the financial
statements would be 'evident to any reader' and that 'no sophisticated analysis of
financial statements is required.' " Id. at 553. One of the defendants stated, how-
ever, that he himself did not know from reading the statements that they contained
the accrual information. Id.
97. Id. at 552.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 553. As stated by the court, "[a]n indication of a loss, on either a cash
or accrual basis, is evidence, at least at first blush, more of financial trouble than of a
profitable operation." Id. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the
combined net profit of the partnership and the corporation was more important than
the corporate cash loss, id., perhaps because the defendant was found to have
concealed the accrual profit figures of both the partnership and the corporation.
100. Stier v. Smith, 473 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir. 1973).
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should have inferred the omitted fact from the limited disclosure, the
omission should not be actionable under the Rule.
2. Loss of Major Contract
One step removed from the disclosure of historical financial state-
ments are disclosures of events that will substantially affect a com-
pany's future financial condition. Among such events, particularly for
a small company, is the loss of a major contract. Allegedly insufficient
disclosures of such events has led to litigation under the Rule.
Chelsea Associates v. Rapanos'0' involved the sale of a controlling
interest in a company that had been engaged for a number of years in
the production of portable water trailers for the United States Army.
Although the business had been dependent upon competitive bids, a
continuing series of contracts had accounted for thirty to forty percent
of the company's total sales. 0 2 Several months before the sale of the
controlling interest, the company announced at its annual meeting
that it had lost the renewal of the army contract, being third lowest
bidder in a competition. The company had challenged the lowest
bidder's qualifications and had requested that the bid be placed "back
on the street."103 At the meeting it further stated that it was "reasona-
bly confident that [it] would ultimately secure the contract."' 0 4 Al-
though the challenge was subsequently successful, the contract was
not "placed on the street," but had been awarded to the second lowest
bidder. Upon receipt of this information, and without disclosing it,
the controlling shareholder contracted to sell his stock.105
The defendant successfully treated the announcement of the loss of
the contract to a competitor as a superior disclosure. Plaintiffs, a
group of sophisticated businessmen and attorneys, had realized that
"there was no guarantee [defendant] would obtain another govern-
ment contract."'' 06 That the contract had been awarded to a competi-
tor, if not the ultimately successful bidder, had been known by the
plaintiff for some months prior to the sale of the controlling interest.
0 7
In view of this disclosure, the court held that the final award was
immaterial: The contract was not "lost" on the date of plaintiff's
purchase "because it had never been [the defendant's] to lose," 108 and
101. 376 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd, 527 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1975).
102. Id. at 935.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 938-39.
106. Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266, 1270 (6th Cir. 1975).
107. The plaintiff's agent, an investment banker who had initiated the transac-
tion, had been present at a shareholder's meeting at which the results of the bid were
made known. 376 F. Supp. at 935.
108. 527 F.2d at 1270.
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no objective evidence suggested that had the low bidder been disquali-
fied, the contract would have been awarded to the defendant rather
than to the second-lowest bidder. 10 9
The disclosure that a contract was in jeopardy was treated as
superior in Rorer International Cosmetics Ltd. v. Halpern,"0 an
action arising out of the sale of a company that had been an exclusive
distributor of a French perfume in North America. Under the terms of
the contract, the distributor was only to create or market perfumes
and products authorized by the French company, and was to use its
best efforts to maximize the American market for the French prod-
uct."' After the plaintiff's purchase of the distributorship, the French
company renounced the contract, for reasons related, among other
things, to the defendant's purchase of unauthorized ingredients before
he sold the distributorship.11 2 The plaintiffs asserted that had they
known about the unauthorized purchases, this information "would
have made them more wary" that the distributorship might be can-
celled, and that the omission to disclose the decision to purchase the
unauthorized ingredients was therefore material"13
The court rejected this argument. Prior to the sale the defendant
had stated to the plaintiff that the distributorship agreement was in
jeopardy, and had refused to make any representations to the contrary
in the purchase agreement with the plaintiff." 4 Viewing such disclo-
sures as superior, the court ruled that the alleged omission regarding
109. Id. Yet the case was not as clear-cut as this language would indicate. Argua-
bly, by purchase of an option, the company had assumed the bidding position of the
lowest bidder. Thus the plaintiffs had arguably bargained for a set of risks that
included an assumption of the position of the lowest bid should the company's
challenge prove unsuccessful, and should the challenge prove successful, an opportu-
nity to bid for the contract "in the street." The defendant had discovered that both of
these possibilities were foreclosed on the date of his sale to the plaintiffs. In view of
these arguable risks bargained for by the plaintiffs, the defendant's failure to disclose
that the company was precluded from bidding may well have been a material
omission, contrary to the court's holding.
110. 502 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
111. Id. at 138-39.
112. Id. at 139-40. Among the other alleged violations were the failure of the
distributor to exert its best efforts to maximize markets for the perfume. The presi-
dent of the French concern had stated to the plaintiff's president that the distributor
had been "undermining [his] trademark for years, and that the [defendants] had
consistently refused to make a genuine effort to expand the sales of [his] fragrances in
the franchised territories." Id. at 139. That the defendant had not used best efforts to
promote sales had been confirmed in an internal memorandum to the plaintiff's
board of directors, and the court therefore found actual knowledge of the alleged
omission, and granted summary judgment on the issue to defendant. Id.
113. Id. at 140.
114. Id.
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unauthorized purchases was not material as a matter of law."5 The
decision to proceed with the transaction notwithstanding the defend-
ant's warnings was evidence that the plaintiffs "consciously decided to
accept jeopardy to the [agreement] as a business risk." I"
Had the plaintiff in Chelsea Associates convinced the court of the
importance of the undisclosed fact that the company would be pre-
cluded from rebidding on the contract, arguably a result might have
been reached more favorable to the plaintiff than that which empha-
sized the general disclosure that the contract was in danger. The
plaintiffs in Rorer too might have prevailed had they convinced the
court of the importance of the undisclosed fact that ingredients were
counterfeited, which might have indicated that the distributorship
termination of which they were generally warned was more likely.
The superior disclosure defense focuses upon inferences to be made
from existing disclosures; but if a number of investment outcomes
could be inferred from a general disclosure and undisclosed facts
would indicate that an adverse outcome was significantly more likely,
the defense should fail.
3. Mergers and Sales of Control
Because both a sale of control of a corporation and a merger may
command a premium price for noncontrolling stock," 7 the imminence
of such events tends to be a material fact. " 8 Whether the mere disclo-
sure of an intent to sell or merge operates as a superior disclosure
depends upon the stage of the negotiations with potential purchasers
at the time of the security transaction.
115. Id. at 140-41. Departing from the objective materiality standard, the court
ruled that the occurrence of unauthorized purchases "was immaterial to this invest-
ment decision made by these plaintiffs." Id. at 141 n.1. The court cited authority to
the effect that the objective, reasonable man test is inappropriate when, as here, the
subject transaction occurred between a single purchaser and a single seller, each well
known to the other. Id. at 140 (citing Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 584 (3d
Cir. 1975)); see also A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 4, § 8.3, at 199 (1971)
("A looser or more subjective [test] may. . . be proper in direct-personal transactions
because of the greater ability of one party to appreciate the position of the other.").
116. 502 F. Supp. at 140. The court's analysis, however, is subject to criticism, in
that if the agreement were in danger it would not end the analysis of a sophisticated
plaintiff. If the contract had been improperly abrogated, or even abrogated upon
"soft" grounds such as failure to exercise best efforts, plaintiff might have had an
action against the French company for breach of contract. Alternatively, had the
contract violation been easily and objectively verified, recourse might only have been
had against the seller for failure to disclose. Facts bearing upon which of the two
events was more likely to occur would tend to affect the sophisticated plaintiff's
investment decision, and would not be covered by a simple disclosure that the
agreement might be terminated.
117. See generally Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Marketfor Corporate
Control, 53 J. Bus. 345 (1980).
118. A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 4, § 7.4(4)(b), at 170.2-171.
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In Hassig v. Pearson,"9 the court found that disclosure of an intent
to sell operated as a superior disclosure when at the time of the
securities transaction only "inquiries" regarding the purchase of the
issuer had been made. The plaintiff, the unsophisticated son of a
former director of a bank, relied upon the defendant, the bank's
president, in financial matters. 20 He had told the defendant on sev-
eral occasions that he wished to sell his holdings of bank stock, and
inquired whether there were any purchasers. The defendant told the
plaintiff that he was not interested in purchasing the stock personally
because he was considering retirement and selling his own block of
control stock.'12 When the plaintiff inquired whether he could sell his
stock together with that of the defendant, the defendant refused. The
defendant then successfully located a potential buyer for the plaintiff's
stock. 2 2 At the time of the sale, the defendant again indicated that he
was considering a sale of his controlling interest in the bank, and
although he had been engaged in discussion with the bank's eventual
purchasers, he responded in the negative when asked if "[t]here was
anything going on at the bank."'21 3 A month after the plaintiff's sale,
the defendant's health took a turn for the worse, and within three
months his block of stock was sold at a premium over that of the
plaintiff. 12 4
The Hassig court held that the defendant's disclosure of his intent to
sell the controlling block of stock was a superior disclosure, which
should have led the plaintiff to infer the conclusion that the defendant
had conducted discussions with potential purchasers.1 25 The court
emphasized that the defendant's contacts with the would-be buyers
"were not in any way 'negotiations,' but at the most were inqui-
ries." 126 Thus, in view of the disclosure of the basic fact that the
defendant was considering selling his stock, the defendant's failure to
disclose that inquiries had been made by potential buyers was not
material. Denying recovery to the plaintiffs, the court referred to this
basic fact as follows:
[The inquiries of potential buyers] were an aspect of this "consider-
ation," and were subsidiary to it. It was not an independent fact or
119. 565 F.2d 644 (1oth Cir. 1977).
120. Id. at 645.
121. Id. at 646.
122. Id. At the time of the sale, the bank employee who purchased the stock was
found not to have known that the bank president was considering selling his bank
stock, much less that anyone was interested in purchasing it. Id. at 647.
123. Id. at 646.
124. The defendant had had "a number of 'spells' or attacks of some nature. At
this time [he] agreed with friends to seriously consider selling his interest .... " Id.
125. See id. at 649.
126. Id.
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matter nor did it, under this record, have any significance on the
extent or degree of "consideration." Thus plaintiff was put on
notice of the fundamental and important "fact.' 2 7
In contrast to Hassig, Rochez Brothers v. Rhoades12 8 involved the
nondisclosure of advanced negotiations for the sale of a company at
the time of the allegedly fraudulent securities transaction. The case
arose from the buy-out of one 50 % owner of a privately held corpora-
tion by the other. As a result of increasing dissension between the two
owners, the board of directors authorized the plaintiff and the defend-
ant to contact prospective purchasers of the company. 12 9 At the same
time the two began to discuss a buy-sell agreement between them-
selves. 30 Although no purchaser was found by the time the plaintiff
sold its interest to the defendant, the defendant concealed from the
plaintiff that he had hired a finder1 31 and the court found that "nego-
tiations had progressed far enough that an offer of a price by one of
the prospective purchasers was to be expected shortly.' 1 32 Soon after
conclusion of the buy-sell agreement between the plaintiff and the
defendant, the defendant received two offers to purchase the com-
pany, both of which fell through. 133 Some months later, however, he
sold the company to a third offeror at a significantly higher price than
he had paid for plaintiff's shares. 34
The Rochez court held in favor of the plaintiff, notwithstanding the
board's authorization to sell the company and the plaintiffs own
efforts to locate a purchaser. In effect, the court refused to character-
ize the defendant's desire to sell the company, which was clearly
known to the plaintiff, as a superior disclosure because the plaintiff,
despite its sophistication, could not have inferred from the known
facts that the negotiations for sale had reached an advanced stage.
Because even estimates of a possible selling price would have influ-
enced plaintiff's willingness to sell at its original asking price, the
court held that the concealment of the negotiations was a material
omission.135
These cases show that the further along negotiations with potential
purchasers are, the more likely the failure to disclose such negotiations
will be deemed a material omission. Thus, whether the disclosure of
an intent to sell is treated as a superior disclosure depends upon the
127. Id.
128. 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976).
129. Id. at 405.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 408.
132. Id. at 411 (footnote omitted).
133. Id. at 406.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 409.
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stage of the negotiations at the time of the securities transaction: As
shown in Hassig, a plaintiff may be expected to infer from the disclo-
sure of such an intent that preliminary discussions have taken place
with potential purchasers, but not, as seen in Rochez, that a dollar
amount has been under discussion or that an offer has been made. A
careful analysis of the expected inference may determine the outcome
of the case.
B. Particular Investment Goals, Perceptions and Opportunities
While a superior disclosure tends to disprove transaction causation
by showing that a plaintiff could or should have inferred the omitted
fact, a defense based on particular investment goals and perceptions
tends to show that the omitted fact, with or without superior disclo-
sures, was of minor importance in the plaintiff's investment decision.
Investment goals, perceptions and opportunities, which are unique to
every investor 136 and which may change over time, 3 7 influence the
investment decision. They affect the inferences drawn by an investor
from a given set of facts as well as the significance of those inferences
to him. Thus, in determining whether an omitted fact, if known,
would have significantly affected a particular investor's decision to
136. That no single set of investment goals, perceptions or opportunities exists is
attested by an elaborate and well-documented set of guidelines concerning investor
suitability to purchase securities from financial institutions. National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 2 states:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any
security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the
recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if
any, disclosed by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his
financial situation and needs.
Policy of Board of Governors on Fair Dealing with Customers, NASD Manual (CCH)
2152, at 2051 [hereinafter cited as NASD Board Policy]. Each member has an
affirmative duty to seek out facts on a customer's financial situation before recom-
mending speculative securities. See id. Rule 15b-10(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3
(1982) imposes a similar obligation upon non-member broker-dealers. Members of
the New York Stock Exchange have a further duty to "[u]se due diligence to learn the
essential facts relative to every customer, every order, every cash or margin account
accepted or carried by such organization and every person holding power of attorney
over any account." New York Stock Exchange Rule 405, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH)
2405, at 3697; see Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1041
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd in part and remanded, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1039 (1978). See generally Cohen, The Suitability Doctrine: Defining
Stockbrokers' Professional Responsibilities, 3 J. Corp. L. 533 (1978); Cohen, The
Suitability Rule and Economic Theory, 80 Yale L.J. 1604 (1971); Roach, The Suit-
ability Obligations of Brokers: Present Law and the Proposed Federal Securities
Code, 29 Hastings L.J. 1069 (1978).
137. A speculative security, for example, should not be recommended unless facts
on the investor's current financial situation are sought out. NASD Board Policy,
supra note 133.
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enter into a securities transaction, the fact finder must assess the
significance of the investor's investment goals, perceptions and oppor-
tunities.
If such goals, perceptions and opportunities are found to have
primarily influenced the investment decision of the investor, notwith-
standing an omission, he cannot be said to have relied upon the
omitted fact in his particular investment decision,'13 and therefore his
recovery should be barred. 139 In those jurisdictions that permit a
defendant to rebut the Ute presumption by introducing sufficient
evidence of non-reliance, 140 a defense based upon the particular in-
vestment goals of the investor will therefore be recognized. Even if the
Ute presumption is deemed to be irrebutable, some courts have none-
theless made use of such evidence in face-to-face transactions by ap-
plying a subjective materiality test, finding that, given the plaintiff's
particular investment goals, the omission was not material to him. 14'
1. Particular Investment Goals, Perceptions
and Opportunities: Cases
Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 142 a case arising out of the acquisition
of four actuarial companies, shows how evidence concerning the par-
ticular investment goals and perceptions of a plaintiff may defeat a
showing of transaction causation in an action arising under the Rule.
The plaintiff's acquisition had taken place after several meetings be-
tween chief executive officers, at which the plaintiff had been pre-
sented with extensive documentation, including copies of the tax re-
turns of the actuarial companies for the previous five fiscal years, a
memorandum of anticipated adjustments to earnings arising out of
possible economies which would be realized in a merger, and the
actuarial companies' client ledgers and employment records. 43 In
addition, the defendant had delivered to the plaintiff's Board of Di-
rectors a memorandum which briefly described the companies and
138. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 102 S. Ct. 1766 (1982); see Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 468 (5th Cir.
1981) ("If the plaintiff would have followed the same course of conduct even with
full and honest disclosure, then the defendant's action (or lack thereof) cannot be said
to have caused plaintiff's loss.").
139. Because most courts do not apply the Ute presumption in misrepresentation
cases, see supra note 38 and accompanying text, evidence of particular investment
goals and perceptions can also be used to show non-reliance in cases of misrepresenta-
tion.
140. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
141. E.g., Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 840 (1975).
142. 513 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975).
143. Id. at 236-37.
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emphasized a computer system under development by the defendant.
The memorandum was accompanied by exhibits showing pre-tax ad-
justed net income for the preceding four fiscal years, and an analysis
of new clients.
Difficulties arose soon after the acquisition. A disenchanted em-
ployee left taking clients with him, and the data processing operation
encountered such high start-up costs that it never became profit-
able. 144 The plaintiff defaulted on its notes tendered in payment,
alleging that, contrary to the representations of the defendant's mem-
orandum, no reduction in expenses had actually occurred in the areas
of pension funding, salaries, and travel and entertainment expenses. It
further alleged that the defendant had misrepresented the present
capacity of the computer program in its memorandum to the Board,
and had failed to list lost clients.145
Rather than defending against the alleged misrepresentations and
omissions, the defendant stressed the importance to the plaintiff of his
particular goals in entering into the transaction. The defendant first
introduced evidence of the investment objectives of the chairman of
the plaintiff's Board of Directors: He had close professional ties with
the defendant, 46 and had initiated and strongly favored the transac-
tion. Instead of focusing upon the data processing failures, the defend-
ant pointed to the plaintiffs interest in the profitable actuarial side of
the business, which continued to show strong profits after the
merger. 47 Finally, the defendant successfully downplayed the weight
attached by the plaintiff to its cost savings estimates by showing that
they were merely ball park figures, the only purpose of which was to
provide an approximation of savings through the elimination of ex-
penses. 148
The Titan Group court concluded that "these broad considerations,
rather than interstitial details of client lists or of immediate data
processing capacity, sparked [the plaintiff's] acquisitive interest."'' 49
Among the additional business considerations in the investment deci-
sion were that the defendant's "companies had a good liquid asset
position [and] were profitable, and . . . the possibility of melding
together actuarial and real estate companies was attractive.' 50 It was
144. Id. at 237.
145. Id. at 238.
146. Id. at 236. After initiating the transaction, the chairman of the board, an
attorney, apparently felt that ties were so strong that he turned the negotiations over
to special counsel to avoid a possible conflict of interest. Id.
147. Id. at 237. In fact, the plaintiff had withdrawn $2.1 million in cash and
securities from the actuarial companies after the acquisition. Id.
148. Id. at 238.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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these matters, on which "an abundance of evidence" was presented,
that the plaintiff "really considered important in entering this face-to-
face transaction."1 5 ' Applying a subjective materiality test, the court
held that under these circumstances the omissions were not mate-
rial. 152
This language from Titan Group shows both the advantages and
the shortcomings of a defense based upon particular investment goals
and perceptions. On the one hand, an emphasis upon such goals and
perceptions can overcome a too narrow focus upon any single area of
disclosure. On the other hand, because the totality of the investment
decision is emphasized, a defendant must present evidence in abun-
dance as to what the plaintiff really considered to be important in the
investment decision. As a result, a defense based solely upon the
particular investment goals of the plaintiff is rare. More frequently, a
defense based upon particular goals and perceptions will be used in
connection with a superior disclosure defense, which diminishes the
significance of the omission in the total mix of information available.
Thus, the defendant in Hirsch not only employed a superior disclo-
sure defense regarding the extent of its net capital deficiency, 5 3 but
also brought into the case the particular investment goals of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff not only hoped to see its purchase of the
defendant's securities increase in value, but anticipated at least three
other significant benefits in connection with the investment. A third
party, an "internationally respected underwriter" with substantial
underwriting accounts, had expressed interest in joining the transac-
tion, and its underwriting capability "promised all the benefits of
diversification."'' 54 Moreover, the defendant's size and trading volume
were capable of supporting the overhead represented by modern auto-
mated equipment, which the plaintiffs believed was necessary to the
survival of their firm.' 55 Despite the plaintiff's discovery that the
defendant's back office problems "were a 'bloody mess,' ",156 they
admired the administrative skills of one partner in the underwriting
151. Id. at 239.
152. Id.
153. See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
154. Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 756 (2d Cir. 1977).
155. Id. at 753-54. In addition to these particular goals, certain factors diminished
the effect of the alleged omission. The existence of a $20 million line of credit with a
prominent family, which had been denied by defendant's controller, was reaffirmed
by a principal who was a member of the family. Although $2.5 million of the line
had been drawn down, the principal indicated that he had "never come back from
[the family home] empty-handed." The plaintiff testified that "out of respect for [the
individual's] honor, [he] refrained from pursuing the matter further." Id. at 756-57.
156. Hirsch v. du Pont, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,645, at 90,204 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), alf'd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977).
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firm, considering him "the perfect man to tackle [the] back office
snarl. 1 57 The defendant successfully proved the importance of these
considerations to the plaintiff's investment decision to diminish the
significance of the omission concerning the defendant's capital defi-
ciency. In combination with the superior disclosures, this defense was
extremely damaging to the plaintiff's case. 158
Similarly, the defendant in Oleck v. Fischer'59 successfully com-
bined a superior disclosure defense with a defense emphasizing partic-
ular investment goals. In the transaction in question the plaintiffs sold
their business to the defendant company for cash and promissory
notes. At issue was the company's ability to repay the notes, and the
alleged nondisclosure of the precarious financial condition of one of
the company's debtors, a former subsidiary. 160 In the months prior to
the transaction, the financial condition of the debtor had deterio-
rated,' 61 and three months after the transaction the debtor de-
faulted; 6 2 seven months later a guarantee of the company was called
when the debtor went into bankruptcy. 63 When the company de-
faulted on its obligation to the plaintiffs,16 4 they brought suit against
the company and its accountants.
The defendant 65 first diminished the significance of the omission by
claiming it had made superior disclosures in the financial statements.
The plaintiffs were "experienced and sophisticated businessmen"'66
who acknowledged that they had been provided with "any informa-
tion that [they] thought [they] required."' 6 7 They simply had not
inquired as to the terms of the debtor's obligations.6 8 Moreover, the
terms of such obligations and the guarantee had been disclosed in full
157. 553 F.2d at 756.
158. The Court of Appeals was prompted to note that "the securities laws were
not enacted to protect sophisticated businessmen from their own errors of judgment."
Id. at 763.
159. [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,898 (S.D.N.Y. June 8,
1979).
160. Id. at 95,691.
161. Id. at 95,685-86. Among the allegedly nondisclosed facts said to demonstrate
the subsidiary's "precarious financial position" were the debtor's tangible net worth
deficit in excess of $3 million and a six-month loss in pre-divestiture operations of
over $900,000. Id. at 95,691.
162. Id. at 95,687.
163. Id.
164. The defendant had kept up its payments for twenty-one months after the
default of the former subsidiary, a fact which further diminished the significance of
the omission. Id. at 95,687, 95,692.
165. Before trial, the plaintiffs had settled their claims against all the defendants
except the company's accountants. Id. at 95,681-82.
166. Id. at 95,701.
167. Id. at 95,686.
168. Id. at 95,687.
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in a footnote to the financial statements,6 9 and a reserve against
possible losses had been included in the balance sheet.1 70 Therefore,
"'sufficient references [were made] in the report . . . to alert the
plaintiffs of a less than completely successful marriage between [the
defendant] and [the debtor].' 7'
The defendant then developed facts tending to show that the obli-
gations of the debtor did not play a prominent role in the plaintiffs'
investment decision. It came forward with evidence portraying the
company at the time of the transaction as "an aggressive company,
embarked on a policy of acquisition," its divested subsidiary having
been simply one of many operating divisions.172 The multifaceted
aspect of the company's financial performance had been featured in
annual reports, press releases and management advice upon which the
plaintiffs relied, which together "painted a broad picture of [the
company's] activities and prospects."' 73 The report to shareholders in
particular had emphasized that the company's growth program had
been dependent upon the growing need for coal and natural gas, a
rising demand for business services, and high return-on-investment in
non-manufacturing industries,174 and a recent press release had indi-
cated favorable coal yields from recently acquired mining rights.
75
Assessing the omission in light of these other facets of the company,
the court noted that "[n]ondisclosed facts are not viewed in isola-
tion." ' 70 The divestiture of the debtor "had nothing to do with the coal
division," which had assumed particular importance in the plaintiffs'
transaction.177 In view of the plaintiffs' investment goals, had the
omission been disclosed the " 'total mix' of information" would not
have been significantly altered, 178 and it was therefore immaterial.
In summary, in cases involving face-to-face transactions the defend-
ant may counter the plaintiff's due diligence or materiality evidence
by showing that the plaintiff had access to information which should
have led him to infer the omitted fact. The plaintiff's level of sophisti-
cation is a significant factor in determining the effect of such infor-
169. Id. at 95,701.
170. The balance sheet, which had apportioned the promissory notes between
current assets and non-current assets, indicated that they were "net of reserve of
$500,000 for losses," referencing the footnote which disclosed the complete terms of
the divestiture. Id. at 95,685-86.
171. Id. at 95,701.
172. Id. at 95,692.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 95,686.
175. The press release indicated that "coal yields of 3000 tons a day [had been
attained from the company's] long-term coal mining rights recently acquired in West
Virginia and Kentucky." Id. at 95,686.
176. Id. at 95,691.
177. Id. at 95,692.
178. Id.
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mation, 179 and as long as he had access to it the plaintiff need not have
actually read the information.18 0 Evidence of such superior disclosure
can be an effective weapon in the defendant's arsenal, tending to
rebut the reliance presumption or a showing of materiality, or to
establish a failure to exercise due care. Moreover, if an omitted fact is
found to be material, a defendant may offer evidence that even if the
omission had been discovered, other investment considerations of the
plaintiff would have outweighed it in the investment decision. Evi-
dence of such considerations by the plaintiff may counter proof that
he relied on an omission in face-to-face transactions.
III. THE INVESTMENT DECISION AND CAUSATION
IN OPEN MARKET TRANSACTIONS
The elements of a face-to-face investment decision that affect trans-
action causation under the Rule are also present in public markets. In
cases arising under the Rule in public markets, however, the analysis
may be made more complex by the presence of secondary sources of
information, other traders and brokers and advisors; but the basic
principles of the analysis of transaction causation remain valid.
A. Superior Disclosure
In open market transactions, the presence of other traders and the
mechanics of information diffusion in the markets may make it easier
for the defendant to allege a superior disclosure, as a vastly wider
domain of primary and secondary sources of information is deemed
accessible to a plaintiff. The amount of information available to
investors in the open market is illustrated in Rifkin v. Crow.'8' An
impressive list of disclosures and information was developed by the
plaintiff as proof of positive reliance on defendant's misrepresenta-
tion, but the list is no less applicable to a defendant's proof of superior
disclosure. Included in the Rifkin list were direct communications
from the company, such as annual and interim reports, press releases
and shareholder newsletters, and the text of the company president's
speeches. 182 Additionally, the plaintiff cited sources that were not
direct communications from the company, but rather "secondary
sources." Included among these were newspaper articles and articles
179. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
180. See Rice v. Baron, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,200, at 96,583 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1979).
181. 574 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1978).
182. Id. at 259.
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in both financial and trade journals. 8 3 This list, while somewhat
atypical of the sources used in a decision to purchase shares on the
open market,18 4 demonstrates the sources of information available to
an investor in public markets.
The secondary sources of information listed in Rifkin have no direct
parallel when securities of closely held companies are concerned. As
the number of shares of a company held by the public increases, its
coverage by financial analysts and institutions tends to increase. The
SEC recently recognized this by reducing the formal disclosure re-
quirements for companies having a "float" that exceeds a specified
level.8 5 Trading volume, while less susceptible of objective measure-
ment, also bears a positive correlation to coverage by such institu-
tions. 8 6 Other information disseminators, such as general economic
and financial publishers, analytic/advisory services, and statistical/
reference services, generally follow the same types of criteria used by
183. The secondary sources included, in addition to financial publications and
trade journals, a report of a management consulting firm as to the potential of optical
recognition equipment. Id.
184. Those with sizeable investments in the stock market will devote significant
resources to the development of sophisticated market strategies. Barry, The Eco-
nomics of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1307, 1332
(1981).
185. The SEC has adopted the Form S-2 and S-3 registration statements, reducing
the disclosure necessary under the Securities Act of 1933 for companies of a certain
size subject to Exchange Act reporting requirements. Form S-3 in particular permits
extensive incorporation by reference, and is available to companies with a $150
million "float" of securities in public hands, or with a float of $100 million and a 3
million share annual trading volume. Sec. Act Rel. No. 6383, [1937-1982 Accounting
Series Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,328, at 62,997 (Mar.
3, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Integrated Disclosure Release].
The proposed Form A, a predecessor to Form S-3, was to be available to compan-
ies on the basis of net income requirements and non-default "quality of issuer"
requirements having little to do with an efficient market. See. Act. Rel. No. 6235,
[1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,649, at 83,491-92 (Sept. 2,
1980). The "quality of issuer" tests were dropped in favor of tests reflecting efficient
market criteria, following a review by the Commission of its integrated disclosure
proposal. See. Act. Rel. No. 6331, 23 pt. 1 SEC Docket 288, 290 (Aug. 18, 1981)
[hereinafter cited as Integrated Disclosure Proposal]. In considering prospective
criteria, the Commission did not limit itself to simply "reexamining existing stand-
ards... or the earlier proposed Form A standards." Integrated Disclosure Proposal,
supra, at 293. It surveyed 1200 companies traded on the New York, American and
regional stock exchanges and over-the-counter stocks quoted in the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ), as well as non-
NASDAQ over-the-counter markets. Id. at 292 n.27. Additionally, the Commission
reviewed "various types of criteria used by investment institutions in research cover-
age decisions, by financial publishers and service providers in reporting decisions, by
trading market organizations in listing and delisting situations and by the Federal
Reserve Board in determining marginable over-the-counter stocks." Id.
186. Integrated Disclosure Proposal, supra note 185, at 293.
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investment institutions. 18 7 The markets for debt securities are widely
recognized to depend heavily upon independent rating services.', At
least one court has recognized the value of secondary sources of infor-
mation in the capital markets, noting that "[i]n the common run of
day-to-day business, professional securities analysis is perhaps the best
way to aggregate and evaluate information in the securities markets;
the analysts thus serve themselves, their clients, and the public interest
in efficient capital markets all at the same time."'8 9
A defense based on superior disclosure, therefore, may be applica-
ble in open market omissions cases. As in face-to-face transactions,
evidence of a superior disclosure may be relevant to the issue of the
plaintiff's due diligence, the materiality of an omission or the plain-
tiffs loss.
1. Superior Disclosures in the Public Domain: Cases
The effect of a plaintiff's broadened "access" to disclosures is illus-
trated in Schulman v. Weil.11Q Schulman involved the purchase of a
speculative security following a discussion between the plaintiff and
the defendant, a major stockholder and consultant to the company.
The defendant had suggested that the plaintiff "could make a 'lot of
money' by purchasing [the] stock," and that it was something he
"could 'put away for his children,' " allegedly omitting the speculative
nature of the investment. 191 A dispute arose as to whether the defend-
ant had shown the plaintiff a recent prospectus. Additionally, al-
though the plaintiff had requested a prospectus from his broker, he
had been informed that it was not readily available, and had in-
structed his broker to purchase the stock anyway.192
The prospectus, which disclosed the speculative nature of the in-
vestment, was treated by the court as a superior disclosure. Whether
the plaintiff had read it was not the issue; the defendant had been
reasonably entitled to believe that plaintiff had access to the prospec-
tus. The plaintiff, an experienced buyer and seller of stock, "knew
what a prospectus was, knew that he was entitled to obtain one, and
could have obtained one if he had seriously tried to do so.' 193 The
court noted that the defendant had "no duty to disclose information to
one who reasonably should already be aware of it.' 194
187. Id.
188. Id. at 296 n.46.
189. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51
U.S.L.W. 3373 (Nov. 16, 1982).
190. 466 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
191. Id. at 433-34.
192. Id. at 434.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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In Phillips v. Reynolds & Co.,195 the plaintiffs purchased stock from
a broker-dealer on the basis of certain oral representations concerning
the bright prospects of a new issuer which boasted a new process for
the production of steel from low-grade ores.196 The plaintiffs, a char-
tered life insurance underwriter and the manager of an insurance
company, alleged the nondisclosure of a $9 million deficit which
appeared on the company's earnings statement. 197 Each plaintiff had
received from the defendant a copy of an article in a general circula-
tion magazine discussing the new process and indicating that "$12
million has been poured into [the company] without a cent of profit,
but by the end of this year [the president] hopes to start breaking even
and by next year to show some earnings."'' 98
The court held that because there was reasonable certainty that the
article had been read, 99 it operated as a superior disclosure.20 0 The
article did not "simply and directly aver . . . a $9,000,000 deficit" on
the earning statement, but the plaintiffs were "experienced business
executives undoubtedly familiar with balance sheets, the problems of
embarking upon new enterprises, and the tendency of management to
be euphemistic about losses." °2 0' From the superior disclosures in the
article, they "should have been aware that a significant deficit existed,
and if they were concerned about the precise amount they could easily
have found out before purchasing. -2 0 2 The plaintiffs' claim of reliance
on the omission was therefore defeated.
Superior disclosures have also been found in unread journals and
filings, as recognized in Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer Corp.
20 3
The defendant in Beissinger had been engaged in a computer leasing
business, and had made substantial purchases of one computer model
before a successor computer was introduced. 20 4 The annual report on
which the plaintiff claimed he had relied indicated that while the
successor model had more capacity, it was also more expensive, and
195. 294 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
196. Id. at 1250.
197. Id. at 1253.
198. Id. at 1251 (quoting New Era for Steel?, Time, Apr. 7, 1961, at 94).
199. The court noted that "[h]ad the document given them by [the defendant]
been long and detailed, and the deficit disclosed in small print or in an obscure place,
plaintiffs might not be charged with knowledge. The . . .article, however, was a
concise summary which could be digested in a few short minutes." Id. at 1254.
200. See id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,613 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 1981).
204. Ninety-six percent of the company's stated $158 million computer inventory
had consisted of IBM System/360 computers, when IBM introduced the System 370.
Id. at 93,027.
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that although the impact of the successor computer could not be
predicted, management did not anticipate significant decreases in
rentals of the original model.205 The plaintiff alleged that the defend-
ant had not sufficiently warned of the adverse impact of the newer
model, had failed to state that the newer model had more capacity per
unit cost and that it would only be more expensive for some users.208
The court ruled for the defendant on the basis of superior public
disclosures in the public domain other than in the allegedly misleading
annual report. Among the disclosures operating as superior in the case
was the Form 10-K, filed with the SEC days before the annual
report. 207 The 10-K had stronger cautionary language regarding the
newer computer model than did the allegedly misleading annual
report.2 08 More significantly, for at least a year prior to the plaintiff's
purchase, the relative merits of the newer model had been the subject
of both public announcements by its manufacturer and extensive
public debate in a trade journal.2 0 9 In view of the disclosures in the
IO-K, the manufacturer's announcements and the trade journal
articles, the court found:
205. Id. at 93,028.
206. Id. "In spite of the logical conclusion that the impact of System/370 on
[defendant's] operations depended substantially upon whether customers needed
greater computer capacity," the Court noted that "neither [of plaintiff's experts]
deemed it provident to study [defendant's] customer mix or requirements" or its
computer portfolio, or the cost of converting from System/360 to the newer model.
Id. at 93,031.
207. Id. at 93,036.
208. The Form 10-K had referenced the newer computers and stated that any
impact upon the company's business would be adverse. It further stated that "[o]bso-
lescence [sic] may also be a significant factor in the Company's ability tofurther lease
or sell computers in that computer manufacturers continually introduce new prod-
ucts and improvements which cannot generally be installed on older computers. "Id.
at 93,032-33 n.34 (emphasis in original).
That disclosures in a Form 10-K may operate as a superior disclosure may become
less significant if a plaintiff is precluded from the Rule's implied remedy by the
existence of express remedies for deceptive filings under other sections of the securities
laws. In Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 102 S. Ct. 1766 (1982), the court held that notwithstanding recognition of
the overlap of remedies issue in recent Supreme Court cases curtailing the scope of
the Rule, id. at 541 & n.6, an express remedy concerning deceptive SEC filings
should not preclude an implied remedy under the Rule, or else the class of potential
plaintiffs would be restricted "to the unlikely few who actually viewed and relied on
the misleading [filing]." Id. at 543 (quoting Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545,
556 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980)).
209. Id. at 93,032. The court noted that "a great deal of information concerning
the potential adverse impact of System/370 was already available to the investing
public," in part as a result of a series of articles in the journal Computerworld. Id. at
93,039. The capacities of the newer model, however, were not completely known.
Id. at 93,030-31.
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[T]he market would have already been well aware of any uncer-
tainty concerning the Company's future. Therefore ... there was
no substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would have
viewed [the statements in the annual report], either individually or
in combination with each other, as having significantly altered the
'total mix' of information available to the public. 210
Thus, the Northway standard of materiality-as expanded to include
public information-was not met.
2 1 1
Unlike the Phillips court, which required reasonable certainty that
a superior disclosure in the public domain was read before the reliance
presumption was rebutted, the Beissinger court held that a plaintiff
could be presumed to have read corrective statements or disclosures in
the public domain, thereby defeating a claim of materiality. Never-
theless, both cases turned upon a superior disclosure in the public
domain to which the plaintiff had "access.'" In this regard, the proof is
similar to that in a face-to-face transaction, with simply a wider
domain of information to which the plaintiff may be deemed to have
access; it is a difference in degree, not in kind. The presence of other
traders in the market introduces the opportunity for a superior disclo-
sure defense of a different kind.
2. Loss Causation
In open market transactions, a superior disclosure may be evidence
that the particular plaintiff suffered no compensable injury. In such
circumstances even if the plaintiff had been unaware of a superior
disclosure in the public domain, other traders may be presumed to
have traded upon such information.2 12 The collective trading decisions
of such investors would tend to impact the price at which the plaintiff
transacted, and because of the effect of the superior disclosure upon
market price, the plaintiff would not have been damaged by the
omission.
The rationale implicit in Schulman and Phillips, that unread supe-
rior disclosures may impact other traders and hence be "assimilated"
210. Id. at 93,032-33 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). By adding the last
phrase "to the public" the court further emphasized that it took an expanded view of
information to which an investor has "access" in public markets. The existence of the
information on the market in the articles and the Form 10-K tended to demonstrate
that the allegedly misleading statements in the annual report were not part of a
common scheme to defraud: "Had [defendant] been engaged in 'a common scheme to
manipulate the value of stock,' surely such information would have been concealed."
Id. at 93,036 (quoting Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 79, 84 (M.D. Fla. 1977)).
211. [Current] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,613, at 93,032 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16,
1981).
212. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
816 (1976).
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in the market price relied upon by plaintiff, was explicitly stated in
Beissinger.21 3 The Beissinger court went further than Schulman and
Phillips in indicating that not only did the plaintiff have access to such
unread disclosures, but that such disclosures would have impacted the
market price upon which the plaintiff had relied in his purchase.
Therefore the plaintiff, who retained the burden of proof regarding
damages, had failed to show damages with any degree of certainty. 21 4
Although the plaintiffs expert witness testified that full disclosure in
the annual report would have caused an immediate drop in price, he
expressed no opinion as to the effect upon market price of appropriate
disclosures at times other than the date of the annual report. 21 -5 He also
acknowledged that the spread between price and "true market value"
may have narrowed "because the stock price may have assimilated
some of the announcements of other leasing companies. 216 The court
found this testimony insufficient to prove damages or entitlement to
the benefits of a theory that the market had assimilated the adverse
information after the purchase. 21 7
B. Particular Investment Goals, Perceptions and Opportunities
In open market transactions, as is true in face-to-face transactions,
a presumption of reliance may be rebutted by a showing that the
plaintiff relied upon matters extraneous to the market and personal to
him 218 In hypothetically "efficient" capital markets it has been recog-
nized that particular investment goals and perceptions may indeed
have little importance: If all information is already incorporated into
the price of a security, one stock may be as good a buy as another,
because each reflects an intrinsic value around which its price varies
randomly, 219 and an investor might as well invest in an index fund as
213. [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,613, at 93,039 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16,
1981).
214. Id. at 93,037-40.
215. Id. at 93,039.
216. Id. at 93,037 (emphasis in original).
217. Id. at 93,040 & n.71. Compare id. (plaintiff failed to prove damages) with
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975) (defendants may disprove
causation by a showing that an insufficient number of traders relied on a deception to
inflate the price), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
218. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 816 (1976).
219. In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 144-46 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Note, The
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the
Securities Industry, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 1031, 1035 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ECMH]
("Under conditions of efficiency, no investor, using only information also generally
available to other investors, can systematically identify and acquire undervalued (or
overvalued) securities"); see id. at 1040 n.38 citing Samuelson, Proof that Properly
Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 Indus. Mgmt. Rev. 41 (1965)).
[Vol. 51
1982] lOb-5 OMISSIONS & INVESTMENT DECISION 431
try to "beat the market" in a particular security. 220 Evidence that the
price of a security in "efficient" capital markets tends to reflect all
publicly available information has been recognized in the legal litera-
ture, 2 21 by the SEC 222 and by the courts. 22 3 -
Whatever the validity of the efficient capital market hypothesis on
a broad scale, however, substantial evidence, indicates significant de-
partures from randomness "in the contexts' provided by particular
companies, short-term trading, seasonal patterns, exogenous market
effects, and on exchanges other than the New York Stock Ex-
change. -2 2 4 Stated another way, whatever the effect upon price of the
activities of a broad aggregate of investors, 225 pockets of inefficiency226
220. Barry, supra note 184, at 1333 ("The proliferation of index funds and the
steady increase in the monies committed to them over the past decade provide some
measure of the degree to which the ECMH has gained acceptance among both
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors."). Such index-related investments have
more recently included options on the future value of particular stock indexes.
221. Barry, supra note 184, at 1333-59; ECMH, supra note 219, at 1031; Note,
Broker Investment Recommendations and the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis:
A Proposed Cautionary Legend, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 1077, 1089-90 (1977); Note,
Disclosure of Future-Oriented Information Under the Securities Laws, 88 Yale L.J.
338, 339 n.10, 344 n.32 (1978).
222. As stated by the SEC, "[t]his form [S-3] is predicated on the Commission's
belief that the market operates efficiently for these [widely followed] companies, i.e.
that the disclosure in Exchange Act reports and other communications by the regis-
trant, such as press releases, has already been disseminated and accounted for the
market place." Integrated Disclosure Proposal, supra note 185, at 290. The new
dissemination requirements were "developed, in part, on the premise that informa-
tion regularly furnished to the marketplace . . . may be reflected in the price of the
outstanding securities, and thus need not always be reiterated in a prospectus in the
context of a distribution." Integrated Disclosure Release, supra note 185, at 62,993
n.9.
223. E.g., Abrams v. Johns-Manville Corp., [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 98,348, at 92,157 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (plaintiff alleged that she would not
have paid purchase price "if [she] had known that the market price did not reflect the
value of the company"); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 145 (N.D. Tex. 1980)
(court cited trading strategy of some institutional investors who rely upon the effi-
cient market hypothesis "by simply buying a random cross-section of stocks").
Several commentators have noted the implications for securities regulation of the
efficient capital market hypothesis. Barry, supra note 184 at 1333 ("Taken at face
value, the ECMH throws into doubt traditional justifications for almost every phase
of securities regulation."); ECMH, supra note 219, at 1034 ("The ECMH evidence
...calls into question both the goal and the means of SEC regulation."). If the
ECMH were completely valid, and capital markets were perfectly efficient, the
existence of market prices incorporating all relevant information would make manip-
ulation and fraud theoretically impossible. Barry, supra note 184, at 1350.
224. Barry, supra note 184, at 1336.
225. As Professor Samuelson noted,
If intelligent people are constantly shopping around for good value, selling
those stocks they think will turn out to be overvalued and buying those they
expect are now undervalued, the result of this action by intelligent investors
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may present the opportunity for rewards for "having the first vi-
sion. '227 Through "expenditure of effort, time and money in research,
and talent and training in analysis [one may have the] opportunity to
capitalize on the value of being the discoverer of [new] informa-
tion"228 or of reacting to information in a unique way. The lure of
"developable values,"' 22 9 the direct result of short-term and other inef-
ficiencies in the capital markets, would lead an investor-even a
passive investor-to select one investment over another and to disre-
gard the market as his "agent. '230
Although favorable information that is not material to a seller may
cause other "reasonable" sellers to raise their asking price, the seller
who for his own reasons reacts differently to such information might
still tend to transact at his original asking price. A buyer would
transact at his "ask" before moving to the higher asking prices of the
"reasonable" sellers.2 31 Similarly, adverse information that is not ma-
terial to a buyer may cause other "reasonable" buyers to lower their
bid prices. Yet the buyer who for his own reasons reacts differently to
such information might still tend to transact at his original bid price,
because sellers would transact at his bid before moving to the lower
bid prices of the "reasonable" buyers.232 Thus, reliance on a defend-
wrill be to have existing stock prices already have discounted in them an
allowance for their future prospects.
B. Malkiel, The Inflation Beater's Investment Guide: Winning Strategies for the
1980's, at 63 (1980); accord Barry, supra note 184, at 1332 ("Investors are a devoted
army of researchers who keep the market continuously informed. By trading, mil-
lions of sophisticated and unsophisticated investors continuously transmit to the
marketplace valuable information from every corner of the economy.").
226. The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1143, 1155, n.50 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Market Fraud].
227. Brudney, supra note 11, at 341.
228. Id.
229. Id. The investor's "search is not merely for bargains, but for developable
values in corporate enterprises." Id. An investor may take an active part in bringing
about or maturing'those latent values, as in a tender offer situation, or simply take a
passive role, as when the investor's purchase and that of others tend to drive up the
price of a security, making new financing more attractive for the company.
230. In re LTV See. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980). Not only
individual investors, but "the investment community continues to act as if undervalu-
ation can be detected," id. at 145 n.7, and the fact "that different types of informa-
tion are impounded into stock prices at varying speeds and with varying degrees of
accuracy accords with the common sense of securities professionals." Barry, supra
note 184, at 1348 n.158.
231. The price move following the transaction goes not to the issue of transaction
causation discussed here, but more properly loss causation or damages, on which the
actions of other traders, in contrast, do have an impact.
232. But see Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 367 n.3 (2d Cir. 1981) ("If anything,
[plaintiff's] testimony indicates that a lower price accurately reflecting [the compa-
ny's] true financial position might have led her to buy more stock."), vacated as moot
sub nom. Price Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 51 U.S.L.W. 3418 (Nov. 30, 1982). The
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ant's omission of a material fact would be absent, because the inves-
tor, for his own reasons, would have transacted absent the omission.
2 33
Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co.234 turned upon an open market
investor's particular reasons for entering into an investment. In that
case the plaintiff sought to recover damages for alleged deceptions in
an offering circular which he had received ten days after the purchase
of hospital authority bonds. 235 He could not recall which broker had
sent him the bonds, and he had no specific recollection of reading the
circular. 236 Even viewing the facts most favorably to the plaintiff on
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court was unable to
find a genuine factual dispute concerning reliance. The plaintiff had
admitted that he had "purchased [the bonds] because he supported
locating the proposed hospital near his home, 2 37 leading the court to
conclude that the "plaintiffs determination was influenced primarily
by factors personal to him and unrelated to the alleged misrepresenta-
tions and omissions. 238
court's comment either assumes that the plaintiff would have delayed her order until
other trades impacted the price, or addresses the issue of loss causation or damages
regarding a price move after her transaction.
233. This analysis may not apply to the investor who invests for reasons concern-
ing technical forces of supply and demand. In such cases the timing of an order and
hence transaction causation may directly relate to the actions of other traders, and
disclosures regarding market information assume greater importance than "funda-
mental" disclosures regarding a company. See, e.g., Pachter v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 417 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 594 F.2d 852 (2d
Cir. 1978).
234. Civ. No. 76-0-423 (D. Neb. Aug. 29, 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 713 (8th Cir.
1978).
235. Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 578 F.2d 713, 718 (8th Cir. 1978).
236. The court noted there were "no suggestions that plaintiff was involved in
comparison shopping, balancing the instant securities against others, on the basis of
the information contained in the offering statements." Civ. No. 76-0-423, slip op. at
5 (D. Neb. Aug. 29, 1977).
237. Id. at 4.
238. Id. at 5. The court of appeals, quoting this passage, upheld the district court's
finding of nonreliance, but "express[ed] no opinion as to which factors did induce
[the plaintiff] to buy." 578 F.2d at 719.
The particular investment goals and perceptions of an investor may be used to
show nonreliance on price even in a fraud-on-the-market case. In Panzirer v. Wolf,
663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated as moot sub nom. Price Waterhouse v. Pan-
zirer, 51 U.S.L.W. 3418 (Nov. 30, 1982), the plaintiff's particular set of investment
goals and perceptions related to her familiarity, as a substitute teacher, with poten-
tial educational markets for videocassettes. Id. at 366. Her particular conception of
developable value in the investment related to the company's participation in those
markets, which the plaintiff's own experience led her to believe was promising. Id.
After reading a favorable newspaper article which brought the stock to her attention,
the plaintiff checked the price and, as she testified, would not have purchased the
shares if the price was "very high" or "outrageous." Id. at 367 n.3. Under these
circumstances an "outrageous" or "very high" price clearly related to the plaintiff's
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Just as market information may be received by the investor through
secondary sources, 239 an investor's personal investment strategy and
goals may be communicated to an intermediate or "secondary" party.
The broker or personal advisor is presumed to take into account the
particular factors that may lead the individual to make an investment
decision, and as such, may function as the "extension" of such factors
personal to the investor in the markets. The advisor assists the investor
in evaluating possible pockets of inefficiency or situations perceived to
present the opportunity for "developable value. 2 40
In view of the attention presumably given to the personal circum-
stances of investors by their advisors, the courts have uniformly found
that reliance on such advisors may defeat a presumption of reliance
upon other communications and disclosures. 241 Thus, in Beissinger, a
presumption of reliance was rebutted by a showing that, in addition
to the plaintiffs failure to read the annual report in question, the
plaintiff "did rely upon the recommendation of ... the comptroller of
a client." 242 Similarly, in the Chelsea Associates case243 the court noted
that "[t]he facts of this case ... suggest a buyer who insisted on
buying because of the confidence the buyer had in its representative
[broker] .... If there was a Pied Piper of [the transaction] it was not
[the defendant] but ...the intimate representative of the plaintiff
buying group.1"244
In Greenspan v. Brassler,245 the plaintiffs alleged that they had
relied upon a secondary source, Standard and Poor's "tear sheets,"
particular estimate of the developable value of the investment. To the extent that her
estimate exceeded the market price, even at the allegedly inflated level, she found
that the price was an "attractive" situation justifying a purchase. Id. The Second
Circuit held that the plaintiff did not rely on the integrity of the market price, and
noted that price was "merely [a] neutral [factor which] presented no impediment to
her acting on the favorable notice" in the newspaper article. Id. at 367. Nevertheless,
the court denied summary judgment against her, extending the fraud-on-the-market
theory to hold that the plaintiff relied on the integrity of the market in producing the
information reported in the newspaper article. Id. at 368.
239. Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 367 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated as moot sub
nom. Price Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 51 U.S.L.W. 3418 (Nov. 30, 1982).
240. See supra notes 224-33 and accompanying text.
241. See, e.g., Jezarian v. Csapo, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,692, at 98,640 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("[T]he absence of transaction causation cannot
be cured by a fraud on the market theory, since [plaintiff's] purchase appears to have
been solely the result of reliance on its broker's advice."); Market Fraud, supra note
226, at 1150 ("[a] plaintiff who purchased on his broker's general recommendation
would be barred from recovery, absent actual reliance.").
242. [Current] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) k98,613, at 93,036 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16,
1981) (emphasis in original).
243. See supra notes 101-09 and accompanying text.
244. 527 F.2d 1266, 1271 (6th Cir. 1975) (quoting district court opinion, 376 F.
Supp. 929, 941 (E.D. Mich. 1974)).
245. 78 F.R.D. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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which in turn were based upon the misleading reports of the defend-
ant. 248 The plaintiffs cited Affiliated Ute for the proposition that proof
of reliance was not necessary in omissions cases, and the court agreed
that reliance could also be presumed in cases involving misrepresenta-
tions and a "comprehensive scheme to defraud" 247 or a "fraud on the
market. '248 The court held, however, that the defendant could rebut
the presumption of reliance with proof that the market's integrity or
the alleged misrepresentations "were not material to plaintiffs or that
they relied primarily on another source. '"249 Because all of the plain-
tiffs' purchases were made in reliance upon their brother's recommen-
dation rather than upon their analysis of the market performance of
the stock, the defense was held to be available. 250
Perhaps the major case in which reliance upon an advisor defeated
the presumption of reliance is Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunica-
tions Corp.25 1 Wilson involved a sophisticated plaintiff, a professional
investor who managed his own investments and a small hedge fund.
The plaintiff, who drew from a variety of information sources in
making his investments, attended an electronics conference at which
the company made a presentation. In a question and answer period
after one session, the company's president indicated uncertainty as to
continued earnings growth if new contracts were not obtained within
thirty to sixty days. 25 2 Following the conference, the plaintiff received
a quarterly report indicating a continued strong profit position, and a
recommendation in the "research list" of the company's market
maker. 25 3 The plaintiff invested on a drop in the price of the stock just
before the following quarter's financial results were released, 25 4 and
246. Id. at 132.
247. Id. at 133 (quoting Competitive Assocs. v. Raventhol, Krekstein, Horwath &
Horwath, 516 F.2d 811, 814 (2d Cir. 1975)).
248. 78 F.R.D. at 133.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 132. The plaintiff's brother, "a professional investor with stockholdings
in several real estate investment trusts, based his recommendation on a generalized
faith in such trusts, rather than on the market's integrity." Id. at 132 n.6. Clearly
market inefficiencies that may lead an investor to choose one investment over another
may also apply to advisers. See supra notes 224-33, 240 and accompanying text.
251. 648 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1981).
252. Id. at 90-92.
253. Id. at 91-92.
254. Id. at 92. Some investigators have found that securities prices "not only
reflect most of the information contained in earnings announcements by the date of
the announcement, but also begin adjusting to the information well before the
formal announcement date." ECMH, supra note 219, at 1046 (footnote omitted).
While the mechanism by which this occurs is not clear, the plaintiff uncovered an
insider sale one month prior to his transaction. His "insider trade" claim was defeated
because of a non-contemporaneous purchase. 648 F.2d at 94-95.
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when the released results reflected deferrals of substantial deliveries
and a bookkeeping error, the plaintiff lost a substantial portion of his
investment. 255
The court treated the warning at the electronics conference as a
superior disclosure, noting that the sophisticated plaintiff had not
bothered to determine whether additional contracts had been in fact
received within thirty to sixty days. Moreover, the plaintiff had in-
vested without contacting management, knowing that the next quar-
ter's results were about to be released.2 56 Because there had not been
reliance upon the disclosures in the quarterly report, the court found
no reliance upon the related omission. 257
More damaging than that, in the court's opinion, was that plain-
tiffs "renewed interest in [the company], leading him to purchase,
appear[ed] to have been stimulated by his luncheon with [his bro-
ker] . "258 At the luncheon, the broker had urged the plaintiff to buy,
and the plaintiff purchased after telephoning another broker to see if
its analyst still "liked the stock. 259
The superior disclosures at the conference, coupled with the reli-
ance of the plaintiff upon his advisors, defeated the plaintiffs showing
that the omission concerning the quarterly results had been a substan-
tial contributing cause of the transaction. 260 The plaintiff had failed to
show that "the violations in question caused the [plaintiff] to engage
in the transaction in question."126'
These cases show that proof of reliance upon the judgment of a
personal advisor who is familiar with the plaintiffs particular invest-
ment goals and perceptions, in contrast to mere reliance upon a
secondary information source,2 62 may defeat a showing of transaction
255. 648 F.2d at 90. That the price continued to decline and the investor lost a
substantial portion of his investment after the purchase indicates that at least in the
particular case of the stock in question, "market efficiency" had not been reached.
256. Id. at 92.
257. Id. at 94. The court treated the issue of updating an outdated statement
analogously to the issue presented by a superior disclosure. Each puts the investor on
notice to make further inquiry, and the failure to do so in Wilson was taken as
evidence that the investor did not rely. Id. at 93-94.
258. Id. at 94.
259. Id. at 91-92.
260. Id. at 94. Although the trial judge had spoken of "determinative factors," the
context in which he had stated his conclusions indicated that he used the term
synonymously with "substantial factors." Id. The plaintiff had not been required to
prove that the defendant's act was "the sole ard exclusive cause of his injury." Id. at
92.
261. Id. at 92 n.7 (quoting Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374,
380 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975)).
262. See Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981) (reliance on newspaper
column sufficient to defeat summary judgment), vacated as moot sub nom. Price
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causation in open market transactions. The exercise of judgment by
the advisor diminishes reliance upon the nondisclosure as a substantial
contributing cause in the investment decision.
CONCLUSION
Transaction causation in an omissions case under the Rule is a
difficult concept, involving several overlapping legal tests that impose
a subjective standard of care on the plaintiff. In determining whether
the plaintiff has met his duty of care, courts and parties to a dispute
should make a careful analysis of the investment decision. At the heart
of the investment decision is the ability of the investor to make infer-
ences from information available to him and to draw conclusions
relating to his investment goals.
A superior disclosure, a fact to which a plaintiff had access and
from which he should have inferred the omission or been put on notice
to make further inquiry, should defeat transaction causation. The
superior disclosure defense is particularly well-suited to open market
cases because the realm of information to which a plaintiff may be
deemed to have access is vast. Moreover, superior disclosures in open
market transactions may defeat a showing of loss causation due to the
corrective effect on price of other investors trading in the securities.
Evidence of the particular investment goals of a plaintiff in face-to-
face transactions may rebut a presumption of reliance by indicating
that even if the plaintiff had known of the omission, other factors
outweighed it in the investment decision. Similarly, in open market
transactions, notwithstanding the efficient market hypothesis, a plain-
tiff's particular investment goals or the judgment of an advisor famil-
iar with those goals may defeat a showing that the omission was a
significant factor in his investment decision.
An examination of the investment decision, which bears in mind the
role of superior disclosures and particular investment goals, illumi-
nates the somewhat difficult application of the legal tests for transac-
tion causation. Counsel and courts would do well to consider them in
the future.
Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 51 U.S.L.W. 3418 (Nov. 30, 1982); Greenspan v. Brassler,
78 F.R.D. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (reliance on Standard and Poor's "tear sheet" suffi-
cient to defeat summary judgment). Reliance on secondary sources may be decided
on a "third party reliance" theory. See Market Fraud, supra note 219, at 1151 n.34.
The above cases in the text show that this theory may be defeated if the secondary
source is an advisor exercising judgment in view of a plaintiff's personal circum-
stances.
